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THE CURRENT TRANSITIONAL STATE OF 
COURT-CONNECTED ADR 
NANCY A. WELSH* 
Obviously, there is much to commend in court-connected mediation 
and what it offers to people caught up in disputes.  With the help of 
mediators, parties may find it more feasible to reflect on their legal and 
extra-legal needs, prioritize among these needs, engage in open and 
thoughtful conversation, develop integrative solutions, and even 
consider the mediators’ dispassionate feedback regarding positions or 
expectations.  Proponents of court-connected mediation can also point 
to a multitude of accomplishments.  For example, and most strikingly, 
many cases settle in mediation.1  For the vast majority of those cases, 
litigants express satisfaction with the process and indicate that they had 
the opportunity to express themselves, that the other parties heard 
them, that they had input into the outcome, and that they view the 
process as fair.2  Additionally, parties rarely seek to undo the 
settlements reached in mediation, though this sometimes occurs.3  
Parties generally view mediation as being as satisfactory or fair as trial,4 
and sometimes even more so.5  Some research indicates that mediation 
 
 * William Trickett Faculty Scholar and Professor of Law, Penn State University, 
Dickinson School of Law.  This Essay incorporates portions of Nancy A. Welsh, Musings on 
Mediation, Kleenex, and (Smudged) White Hats, 33 U. LA VERNE L. REV. 5 (2011), and 
builds upon themes begun there.  I am indebted to Andrea Schneider, Peter Salem, and Susan 
Yates for the invitation to participate in the Court ADR Symposium.  My thanks go to David 
Brown, Christopher Reintjes, and Justin Blake for their research assistance.  All mistakes, of 
course, are mine. 
1. See JENNIFER E. SHACK, RESOL. SYS. INST., BIBLIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY OF COST, 
PACE, AND SATISFACTION STUDIES OF COURT-RELATED MEDIATION PROGRAMS 7 (2d ed. 
2007) (stating that “58% of unlimited cases and 71% of limited cases settled as a result of 
mediation”); Roselle L. Wissler, The Effectiveness of Court-Connected Dispute Resolution in 
Civil Cases, 22 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 55, 58 (2004) (reporting that “[m]ost studies reported a 
settlement rate between 47 and 78 percent”). 
2. Wissler, supra note 1, at 58. 
3. See James R. Coben & Peter N. Thompson, Disputing Irony: A Systematic Look at 
Litigation About Mediation, 11 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 43, 87 (2006); James R. Coben & 
Peter N. Thompson, Mediation Litigation Trends: 1999–2007, 1 WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION 
REV. 395, 403 (2007). 
4. Wissler, supra note 1, at 65–66. 
5. Id. at 66. 
12 - WELSH-11 (DO NOT DELETE) 6/21/2012  9:46 PM 
874 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [95:873 
saves time and costs for both courts and parties.6  Occasionally, 
mediation even achieves communication and outcomes that would be 
unlikely in other court-connected procedures.7  This catalogue of 
achievements clearly affirms the value of mediation. 
For well over a decade, however, other evidence has triggered 
concerns that mediation has strayed from its core mission as a 
mechanism for the meaningful and voluntary resolution of disputes 8 and 
that it has become entangled in the contentious game playing and covert 
manipulation9 that can occur in litigation.  Judicial opinions reveal 
satellite litigation over (1) lawyers’ authority to enter into mediated 
 
6. See Leonard L. Riskin & Nancy A. Welsh, Is That All There Is?: “The Problem” in 
Court-Oriented Mediation, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 863, 873 n.45 (2008); Thomas J. 
Stipanowich, ADR and the “Vanishing Trial”: The Growth and Impact of “Alternative Dispute 
Resolution,” 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 843 passim (2004) (citing to studies showing such 
effects). 
7. See Dwight Golann, How Mediators Can Help with Relationship Repairs, 19 
ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 193, 197 (2001); Julie Macfarlane, Culture Change? A 
Tale of Two Cities and Mandatory Court-Connected Mediation, 2002 J. DISP. RESOL. 241, 
272–77 (observing that when parties attend mediation, many lawyers perceive that the 
outcomes are changed to reflect the parties’ needs and interests); Bobbi McAdoo, A Report 
to the Minnesota Supreme Court: The Impact of Rule 114 on Civil Litigation Practice in 
Minnesota, 25 HAMLINE L. REV. 401, 429 tbl.10 (2002) (reporting that about 31% of 
attorneys voluntarily choose mediation to “[i]ncrease potential for creative solutions”); 
Michael Moffitt, Three Things To Be Against (“Settlement” Not Included), 78 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1203, 1212–14 (2009) (describing the sorts of creative, customized outcomes more likely 
to be achieved through settlement than litigation); Leonard L. Riskin, Decisionmaking in 
Mediation: The New Old Grid and the New New Grid System, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 21 
(2003) (explaining the development of the concept of “problem-definition” to capture “the 
great virtue of mediation,” which “was to help the parties address—in addition to their 
positional claims—what was really at stake for them” and reach responsive solutions); Jean R. 
Sternlight, ADR Is Here: Preliminary Reflections on Where It Fits in a System of Justice, 3 
NEV. L.J. 289, 292–93 (2003); Nancy A. Welsh, Stepping Back Through the Looking Glass: 
Real Conversations with Real Disputants About Institutionalized Mediation and Its Value, 19 
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 573, 629–38 (2004) [hereinafter Welsh, Stepping Back Through] 
(describing the communication and outcomes that occurred in special education mediation 
sessions that were the subject of a small qualitative study).  But see Nancy A. Welsh, Making 
Deals in Court-Connected Mediation: What’s Justice Got to Do With It?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 
787, 813 (2001) (citing to research finding that mediation was no more likely than 
adjudication to produce creative or nonmonetary outcomes) [hereinafter Welsh, Making 
Deals]. 
8. See, e.g., Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of 
Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 1359, 1400–04; Trina Grillo, 
The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1545, 1600–10 (1991); 
see also Eric Yamamoto, ADR: Where Have the Critics Gone?, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 
1055 (1996) (discussing a lack of scholarly criticism of ADR). 
9. See Jim Coben & Lela P. Love, Trick or Treat: The Ethics of Mediator Manipulation, 
ABA DISP. RESOL. MAG., Fall 2010, at 18, 20–21, 25. 
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settlements on their clients’ behalf;10 (2) lawyers’ competence in advising 
their clients to accept11 or reject12 mediated settlement agreements; (3) 
the influence exercised by mediators;13 (4) good-faith and fair-dealing 
violations;14 (5) the proposed vacatur of preliminarily approved 
mediated class settlements;15 and (6) imprecise contract formation.16  The 
process of mediation was adopted by many courts as a means to 
ameliorate wasteful conflict and reduce the courts’ dockets.17  However, 
mediation (or more accurately, those participating in mediation) may 
now be contributing to such conflict and dockets. 
More worrisome, though, are the cases suggesting that some repeat 
users of mediation are exploiting certain aspects of the process, 
particularly the obligation of confidentiality and the mediation privilege, 
 
10. See, e.g., N. Me. Transp., LLC v. OneBeacon Am. Ins. Co., No. 1:10–cv–00370–JAW, 
2011 WL 5009470 (D. Me. Oct. 19, 2011); Gatto v. Verizon Pa., Inc., Civ. Action No. 08-858, 
2009 WL 3062316 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 22, 2009) (stating that lawyers must have “express 
authority” to bind clients to settlement agreements); Jordan v. Adventist Health 
System/Sunbelt Inc., 656 So. 2d 200  (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Gordon v. Royal Caribbean 
Cruises Ltd., 641 So. 2d 515 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994); Omni Builders Risk, Inc. v. Bennett, 
721 S.E.2d 563 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011). 
11. See Benesch v. Green, No. C-07-03784 EDL, 2009 WL 4885215 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 
2009); Cassel v. Super. Ct., 244 P.3d 1080 (Cal. 2011); Guido v. Duane Morris LLP, 995 A.2d 
844 (N.J. 2010). 
12. See Fehr v. Kennedy, 387 F. App’x 789 (9th Cir. 2010). 
13. See Olam v. Congress Mortg. Co., 68 F. Supp. 2d 1110 (N.D. Cal. 1999); Allen v. 
Leal, 27 F. Supp. 2d 945 (S.D. Tex 1998); see also Nancy A. Welsh, Reconciling Self-
Determination, Coercion, and Settlement, in DIVORCE AND FAMILY MEDIATION: MODELS, 
TECHNIQUES, AND APPLICATIONS 420, 430 (Jay Folberg et al. eds., 2004); Nancy A. Welsh, 
The Thinning Vision of Self-Determination in Court-Connected Mediation: The Inevitable 
Price of Institutionalization?, 6 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 9–15 (2001) [hereinafter Welsh, 
Thinning Vision] (describing the allegations in Allen v. Leal and other litigated matters, as 
well as allegations of mediators’ violation of ethics rules) . 
14. See Doctors Hosp. 1997 LP v. Beazley Ins., Civ. Action No. H-08-3340, 2009 WL 
3719482, at *2, *6 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 3, 2009) (involving an insured and insurer, as well as an 
alleged Mary Carter agreement). 
15. See Ehrheart v. Verizon Wireless, LLC, 609 F.3d 590 (3d Cir. 2010). 
16. See Gatto v. Verizon Pa., Inc., Civ. Action No. 08-858, 2009 WL 3062316, at *10 n.1 
(W.D. Pa. Sept. 22, 2009) (calling for settlement negotiations to be conducted in writing, 
rather than orally, to avoid confusion over the terms of the agreement); Haghighi v. Russian–
Am. Broad. Co., 577 N.W.2d 927 (Minn. 1998) (deciding the enforceability of a mediated 
settlement agreement that failed to include statutorily-required terms); Williams v. Kan. City 
Title Loan Co., 314 S.W.3d 868 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010) (reviewing a decision involving the 
failure to memorialize mediated settlement agreements, as required by court rules). 
17. See generally CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & GOVERNANCE, U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L 
DEV., ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION PRACTITIONERS’ GUIDE 5 (1998) (outlining the 
forces that led to alternative dispute resolution). 
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to the detriment of other users of the process.18  A line of cases has 
emerged in which lawyers are the key actors in tales of alleged 
misbehavior and even malpractice.  The defendant-lawyers in these 
cases have then asserted the mediation privilege against their own 
clients in order to keep the clients from introducing evidence that might 
help to prove claims of legal malpractice.19  The upshot is that these 
lawyers have used mediation as a shield and an impediment to their 
clients’ access to the very forum that lawyers are supposed to hold most 
dear—the public courtroom. 
Though these cases are relatively few in number, they should 
motivate mediation proponents to develop and implement strategies to 
counteract such misuse of mediation—through advocacy for measures 
such as tightening mediation privilege statutes, mediators’ insertion of 
preemptive clauses in mediation agreements,20 routine reminders to 
parties during mediation that they can go to trial and that this is a civic 
right that we respect and value,21 use of caucus as a means to allow 
parties to rescind or amend tentative settlements,22 and the inclusion of a 
short cooling-off period in mediated settlement agreements.23  But why 
have mediation proponents not already undertaken all of these tasks?  
What point must we reach before we initiate reform?  Must a crisis 
occur?  What sort of a crisis?  What counts as a crisis?   
Perhaps we as ADR proponents are at one of those uncomfortable 
“ugly duckling” transition points, as court-connected mediation and 
 
18. See, e.g., Cassel v. Super. Ct., 244 P.3d 1080, 1094–96 (Cal. 2011) (discussing cases 
where attorneys used the confidentiality of mediation to keep communications with clients 
from disclosure). 
19. See, e.g., Fehr v. Kennedy, 387 F. App’x 789 (9th Cir. 2010); Benesch v. Green, No. 
C-07-03784 EDL, 2009 WL 4885215 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2009); Wimsatt v. Super. Ct., 61 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 200 (Ct. App. 2007). 
20. See Nancy A. Welsh, Musings on Mediation, Kleenex, and (Smudged) White Hats, 33 
U. LA VERNE L. REV. 5, 22–23 (2011) (citing to Justice Ming Chin’s reluctant concurrence in 
Cassel, 244 P.3d at 1098 (Chin, J., concurring in the result), and to the UNIFORM MEDIATION 
ACT § 6 (2003) and urging mediators to include clauses in their mediation agreements that 
would exempt from the mediation privilege any mediation communications offered to prove 
or disprove claims of professional misconduct or malpractice). 
21. My thanks to Howard Herman, Mediator & Director, United States District Court 
for the Northern District of California, for the conversation that reinforced the importance of 
this point.  
22. This technique was used by Georgia mediator Edie Primm.  For a discussion of post-
settlement settlement, see Max H. Bazerman & Katie Shonk, The Decision Perspective to 
Negotiation, in THE HANDBOOK OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION 52, 55 (Michael L. Moffitt & 
Robert C. Bordone eds., 2005). 
23. See Welsh, Thinning Vision, supra note 13, at 6–7. 
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other forms of court ADR move toward the next stage of the field’s 
evolution.  These transition points are necessary, but as the name I have 
given them implies, they are neither pretty nor terribly welcome.24  On 
the other hand, the discomfort associated with these periods enables us 
to let go; though we recognize and are grateful for what we have 
learned, we are ready to bid the past farewell and turn toward the future 
we must now create. 
During Marquette University Law School’s recent symposium, 
participants had the opportunity to take stock of the current state of 
court ADR, with special emphasis on the family law area.  We learned 
of innovative programs and processes—but we also learned how difficult 
it has become to describe the status of court ADR in a country as large 
and decentralized as the United States, with courts and governance 
traditions that vary dramatically from state to state and even from 
county to county.  We learned that while exciting ADR innovation is 
occurring in some courts, other courts’ ADR programs are under siege 
and have been forced to retrench and justify themselves as core to the 
courts’ mission.  We learned about the many initiatives designed to 
protect children caught up in the conflict and pain that often accompany 
divorce; we also became aware of the difficulty of establishing clear 
professional and normative boundaries among the increasing numbers 
and types of court-connected third parties in this context—e.g., family 
mediators, guardians ad litem, and lawyers assigned by courts to 
represent the interests of children.  
Thus, we learned that ADR’s current interaction with, and patchy 
integration into, the courts is uneven and messy.  We also became aware 
of messiness within the ranks of those who identify as proponents of 
mediation and court ADR.  At the symposium, the various stakeholders 
in court ADR—lawyers, judges, mediators, administrators, 
policymakers, funders, and academics—engaged in impressive 
dialogue.25  Representatives of the legal, social, and psychological 
 
24. I considered naming this a “chrysalis” period, which has much more positive 
connotations, but our field’s transformation is not occurring in private and thus comfortably 
out of view. 
25. These efforts have occurred before, often with Christopher Honeyman serving as a 
key leader or catalyst.  See, e.g., Robert M. Ackerman & Nancy A. Welsh, Interdisciplinary 
Collaboration and the Beauty of Surprise: A Symposium Introduction, 108 PENN ST. L. REV. 1, 
1–3 (2003); Christopher Honeyman, Barbara McAdoo & Nancy Welsh, Here There Be 
Monsters: At the Edge of the Map of Conflict Resolution, in THE CONFLICT RESOLUTION 
PRACTITIONER: A MONOGRAPH BRIDGING THEORY AND PRACTICE 1, 15–16 (2001).  See 
generally Christopher Honeyman, Movable Feast: An Introduction, 5 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT 
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professions that populate the field of dispute resolution also sought to 
reach out to, and learn from, each other.  Simultaneously, though, we 
learned that even within the field of dispute resolution, which espouses 
and truly values both dialogue and collaboration, we can be 
insufficiently respectful of the uniqueness and depth of others’ 
experience and knowledge.  Like many of the lawyers and disputants we 
seek to serve, we like to be heard and to be recognized as people with 
expertise and wisdom.  It is hard, and requires tremendous humility and 
patience, to listen.  So, court ADR’s internal relations also can be 
confusing and difficult.  
The current ugly duckling phase of ADR’s evolution, however, is 
most obvious in the persistent tension that exists between mediation 
proponents’ strong sense of what makes us special or valuable26 and our 
equally strong desire to find a secure and prestigious home within the 
courts.  This ground has been well-plowed,27 but it still plays a central 
role in court ADR’s internal confusion, as well as its uneven and messy 
integration with the courts and even some lawyers’ apparent temptation 
to abuse the protections offered by the mediation process, with relative 
impunity.  Like most ugly ducklings (e.g., rebellious teenagers, uninvited 
newcomers to insular communities, etc.), we are not sure we belong and 
cannot decide whether the better strategy is to declare ourselves as 
different or find a way to fit in. 
Much of what we learned at the symposium was not new.  At this 
point, we have three decades of experience with the institutionalization 
of court ADR.  Court ADR is no longer an innovation and has existed 
 
RESOL. 145 (2004); Christopher Honeyman et al., New York Movable Feast: Boundaries to 
Practice, 5 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 147 (2004); Christopher Honeyman et al., 
Washington, D.C. Movable Feast: The Odds on Leviathan—Dispute Resolution and 
Washington, D.C.’s Culture, 5 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 159 (2004). 
26. See JAMES J. ALFINI ET AL., MEDIATION THEORY AND PRACTICE 1–31 (2d ed. 
2006); Deborah R. Hensler, Our Courts, Ourselves: How the Alternative Dispute Resolution 
Movement Is Re-Shaping Our Legal System, 108 PENN ST. L. REV. 165, 185–88 (2003); Carrie 
Menkel-Meadow, Mothers and Fathers of Invention: The Intellectual Founders of ADR, 16 
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1, 2, 5 (2000); Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, The Merger of Law 
and Mediation: Lessons from Equity Jurisprudence and Roscoe Pound, 6 CARDOZO J. 
CONFLICT RESOL. 57 (2004); Welsh, Thinning Vision, supra note 13, at 3; Nancy A. Welsh, 
You’ve Got Your Mother’s Laugh: What Bankruptcy Mediation Can Learn from the 
Her/History of Divorce and Child Custody Mediation, 17 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 427, 430 
(2009) [hereinafter Welsh, Mother’s Laugh]; Douglas Yarn, The Death of ADR: A Cautionary 
Tale of Isomorphism Through Institutionalization, 108 PENN ST. L. REV. 929, 930–31 (2004). 
27. Robert A. Baruch Bush, “What Do We Need a Mediator For?”: Mediation’s “Value-
Added” for Negotiators, 12 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1, 1 n.1 (1996). 
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long enough to develop its own bureaucracy.  Over the past ten years, 
however, court administrators and scholars have repeatedly reported 
that all was not well.  They detailed significant reductions in court ADR 
staffing and in the amount of time parties are expected to spend in 
mediation, threats to cut ADR programs unless they could justify 
themselves as “core” to the mission of the courts, and pressures to 
produce high settlement rates.28  Some proponents of family-court ADR 
have urged a move away from mediation and toward hybrid ADR 
processes that pair strongly evaluative or adjudicative functions with 
facilitative or mediative functions, in order to assure finality.  Obviously, 
such developments could threaten the primacy of, and courts’ support 
for, mediation.29   
The Marquette symposium therefore offered a particularly good 
opportunity to assess court ADR proponents’ current understanding of 
our field, its value, and the implications of this stage of its 
development.30  At the symposium’s conclusion, the participants were 
asked to respond to the following questions:  “Based on your experience 
and what you’ve heard during the symposium, what is the most 
 
28. See Yishai Boyarin, Court-Connected ADR—A Time of Crisis, a Time of Change, 95 
MARQ. L. REV. 993 (2012); see also Leonard Edwards, Comments on the Miller Commission 
Report: A California Perspective, 27 PACE L. REV. 627, 628, 656 (2007) (advocating mediation 
for New York while identifying challenges in California, including one-hour mediations as 
result of resource and funding issues); Joan B. Kelly, Family Mediation Research: Is There 
Empirical Support for the Field?, 22 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 3, 29 (2004) (acknowledging 
reduced time for mediation); Sharon Press, Institutionalization of Mediation in Florida: At the 
Crossroads, 108 PENN ST. L. REV. 43, 65–66 (2003) (describing the challenge and opportunity 
presented when a state office of dispute resolution was required to “justify general revenue 
funding from the state” and “identify performance measures” without relying solely on 
“efficiency arguments” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  But see Louise Phipps Senft & 
Cynthia A. Savage, ADR in the Courts: Progress, Problems, and Possibilities, 108 PENN ST. L. 
REV. 327, 339 (2003) (asserting that courts increasingly are focusing on their long-term goals 
and therefore are “paying attention to the human element of conflict beyond the legal dispute 
itself[, which] was the impetus for hundreds of state chief judges abandoning short-term 
efficiency goals and signing a pledge committing the courts to become more ‘problem-
solving’” (citing and quoting CONF. OF CHIEF JUSTICES, 52ND ANN. MEETING, RESOLUTION 
22 (2000); CONF. OF STATE CT. ADM’RS, RESOLUTION IV (2000)). 
29. See Peter Salem, The Emergence of Triage in Family Court Services: The Beginning 
of the End for Mandatory Mediation?, 47 FAM. CT. REV. 371, 379 (2009); Welsh, Mother’s 
Laugh, supra note 25, at 429.  
30. See generally Robert W. Rack, Jr., A Letter to My Successor, 26 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. 
RESOL. 429, 430–33 (2011) (reflecting, after nearly twenty-nine years in his position, on his 
approach to integrating his mediation program with the court); Robert W. Rack, Jr., 
Thoughts of a Chief Circuit Mediator on Federal Court-Annexed Mediation, 17 OHIO ST. J. ON 
DISP. RESOL. 609 (2002) (analyzing the “institutionalization” of mediation in the federal 
courts over the twenty-five years following the 1976 Pound Conference).  
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important ‘value-added’31 that you believe court ADR brings to the 
courts?” and “What must occur in order for you to judge current or 
imminent change [to court ADR] as ‘good?’”  My review of the written 
responses to the first question suggests the following primary sense of 
our field’s value, especially in the family area, among the colleagues who 
attended the symposium: 
We offer the added value of allowing disputants to come to their own 
resolution.  We offer self-determination to parents in family-court ADR; 
the opportunity to deal with what is really important to them; individual 
engagement; and the opportunity for parents to take responsibility, 
work through challenges, and arrive at well thought-out solutions. 
We offer the added value of process choice.  We offer additional 
dispute resolution options and the opportunity for diversion to 
processes that will allow divorcing spouses to arrive at the most 
appropriate dispositions. 
We offer the added value of a dignified role for disputants.  We offer 
a problem-solving approach (including the inclusion of key stakeholders 
who would not have legal standing to participate in litigation) and the 
opportunity for parents to behave decently, handle conflict better, learn 
how to communicate, and engage constructively. 
These responses suggest that a certain sort of faith, grounded in the 
principle of self-determination, continues to animate the field of ADR.32  
ADR proponents believe in providing people with the opportunity and 
tools to be their best, enabling them to take responsibility for making 
serious decisions in a deliberative, thoughtful manner.  We believe that 
deliberation and informed decision-making are possible, especially if 
people are given the right tools and sufficient time.  We believe in the 
value of making good and customized decisions and arriving at real 
resolution.  And, finally, we believe that people want to take 
responsibility and want to make the decisions that will affect their lives. 
Admittedly, participants in the Marquette symposium also identified 
the following effects of mediation as “value-added,” but much less 
frequently: 
 
• Easing court dockets; 
• Providing education and information to parties even if 
 
31. Questions about the “value-added” benefits of mediation are common.  See Baruch 
Bush, supra note 26, at 1.  
32. See also Gary L. Gill-Austern, Faithful, 2000 J. DISP. RESOL. 343, 361 & n.75 (2000). 
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disputed issues were not resolved; 
• Providing resource savings in terms of time, money, and life 
disruption; 
• Increasing compliance with outcomes; and 
• Offering parents a better view of the court system. 
 
It is striking that the more practical advantages of court ADR 
garnered so many fewer votes.  It appears that for those who are in the 
trenches of court ADR, meeting the institutional, efficiency-and-
effectiveness-oriented needs of the courts is much less inspiring than 
helping people achieve their potential, especially in consensual 
processes like mediation.33 
What then of the participants’ responses to the second question?  
Recall that the participants were asked to consider what they had heard 
over the course of the symposium, often involving current or imminent 
change, and to determine “[w]hat must occur in order for you to judge 
current or imminent change [to court ADR] as ‘good?’”  
Overwhelmingly, participants indicated that they would judge current or 
imminent change as “good” if it involved greater institutional support 
for court ADR—such as better financing and broader institutional 
support for ADR innovations, funding or alternative resource 
expansion, the creation of new opportunities and programs, diversified 
services for parties, openness to innovation, flexible processes that 
match the complexity of race and economic differences, the 
implementation of new court ADR programs, and inclusion of ADR in 
law school curricula and bar exams.  A few participants admitted that 
they would feel good about change if it involved “manna from heaven,” 
such as an unexpected shift in stimulus funding and a growth in targeted 
tax revenues, or assurances that everyone involved in court ADR would 
keep their jobs.34   
Perhaps this set of responses simply expresses court employees’ 
legitimate fears about job security and their hope for reassurance.  But 
is there also something more here?  Those of us who are court ADR 
 
33. It is important to recall, of course, the setting in which these questions were asked.  
The respondents were people who had made the choice to attend a symposium focused on the 
future of court ADR.  Perhaps it should not be surprising that this self-selected group would 
perceive court ADR as having a value separate from the mechanics of judicial administration. 
34. Consistent with these sentiments, participants later emphasized the importance of 
making personal connections with key judges and policymakers in order to increase their 
understanding and support of court ADR. 
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proponents often identify ourselves as “different”—in a good way.  But 
ugly ducklings are noticeably “different”—and it is not always 
advantageous to be identified with such a conspicuous and different 
group, especially when resources are, or are perceived as, increasingly 
scarce.  Indeed, these sorts of conditions predictably set the stage for 
conflict between different groups.35  Nonetheless, we want the courts to 
accept us for who we are and what we do—and encourage our 
commitment to serving people’s better natures—even when we have 
failed to demonstrate how our commitment to this vision assists the courts 
in justifying their existence or fighting for their share of declining 
economic resources.36  Meanwhile, as already noted, we may have 
allowed some to use our process—and particularly the promise of the 
 
35. See Ronald J. Fisher, Intergroup Conflict, in THE HANDBOOK OF CONFLICT 
RESOLUTION: THEORY AND PRACTICE 166, 166–67 (Morton Deutsch & Peter T. Coleman 
eds., 2000). 
36. Professor Bobbi McAdoo and I have previously observed that “[i]f they are honest, 
courts will clarify that though these objectives [i.e., producing outcomes that respond to 
litigants’ unique extra-legal needs, represent parties’ self-determination, or maintain or 
enhance relationships] are laudable, they must yield to the objectives that are more salient to 
the mission of a public civil litigation system.”  Bobbi McAdoo & Nancy A. Welsh, Look 
Before You Leap and Keep on Looking: Lessons from the Institutionalization of Court-
Connected Mediation, 5 NEV. L.J. 399, 426 (2005).  At the same time, there will be some 
parties who will be likely to refuse to comply with outcomes or will return to court repeatedly 
with new claims arising out of a continuing conflict.  ADR (and especially mediation) 
proponents may be particularly able to demonstrate the value of mediative functions for these 
parties.  See Riskin & Welsh, supra note 6, at 928–29 (suggesting that courts will benefit from 
offering customized mediation to a subset of disputants, just as courts have chosen to develop 
specialized courts to meet the needs of certain litigants).  But see John Lande, How Much 
Justice Can We Afford: Defining the Courts’ Roles and Deciding the Appropriate Number of 
Trials, Settlement Signals, and Other Elements Needed to Administer Justice, 2006 J. DISP. 
RESOL. 213 (2006).  Professor Lande proposes, in light of reduced trial rates, several 
alternative strategies to enable federal courts to achieve their mission of providing justice 
including: giving litigants an array of process options from which to choose; collecting and 
providing to litigants data regarding negotiated settlement outcomes; designing court facilities 
to accommodate various dispute resolution processes; re-allocating judicial responsibilities to 
permit full-time Article III judges to focus on conducting trials; using local advisory groups to 
make changes in courts’ rules and internal operating procedures; and working with other local 
entities to respond to problems facing the justice system.  Lande, supra, at 233–47.  Professor 
Lande also examines options to increase the number of trials.  Id. at 247–51. 
 It is important to note that a few symposium participants hinted that they might be 
willing to perceive current and imminent changes in court ADR as good, even if they involve 
cutbacks, but only if such change is based on: (1) data showing court ADR’s impact for 
parties or evaluation of the experience parties have in ADR; (2) demonstration of cost-
effectiveness of ADR to courts; (3) honesty and transparency about who is affected by court-
ADR changes and how they are affected; and (4) realistic standards of service.  I suspect 
these respondents anticipate that any such assessments will produce positive results for court 
ADR, but there is no guarantee of this.   
12 - WELSH-11 (DO NOT DELETE) 6/21/2012  9:46 PM 
2012] TRANSITIONAL STATE OF COURT-CONNECTED ADR 883 
mediation privilege—in a manner that is entirely inconsistent with and 
even harmful to the principle of self-determination that is so precious to 
us and is also potentially harmful to the legitimacy of the courts. 
We cannot have it both ways.  We must either adapt the mediation 
process to fit the environment of the courts or move on.  I am reminded 
of visionaries, politicians, and artists, who made their original 
reputations by invoking particular traditions, but then turned their backs 
on such traditions when they became too rigid or personally stifling.  
Singer and songwriter Bob Dylan has gone through more than one such 
evolution, with certain “ugly duckling” transition albums marking his 
generally ungracious rejection of his past and an awkward groping 
toward an uncertain future.  At each of these points, he has managed to 
make many fans and friends unhappy.37  But he has been true to his 
inner voice—and has both found new fans and regained many old ones. 
One choice for proponents of court ADR is to reject courts’ calls for 
greater efficiency and settlements, take as much time and care as we 
need to enable parties to come to their own solutions, and regularly defy 
expectations for closure by requiring mediated settlement agreements to 
include cooling-off periods.  But that choice will have consequences.  
One such consequence may be that members of our field will have to 
leave the courts and instead offer their services through the community 
mediation programs that have institutionalized facilitative, 
transformative, and other self-determination-oriented approaches.  
Alternatively, members of the field may choose to strike out on their 
own, and offer their services on a for-profit basis. 
Another very different approach would involve becoming humbler 
regarding ADR and its potential and less committed to being 
“different” from the courts’ generally hierarchical, adjudicative 
approach.  This is especially applicable, of course, to mediation.  Hints 
of the potential fruitfulness of this approach exist in the same responses 
listed previously.38  Symposium participants found value in court ADR 
processes’ ability to facilitate “civility and decision-making” as parties 
 
37. See ANTHONY SCADUTO, BOB DYLAN: A BIOGRAPHY 208–10 (1973) (describing 
Bob Dylan’s abandonment of folk music and protest songs); ROBERT SHELTON, NO 
DIRECTION HOME: THE LIFE AND MUSIC OF BOB DYLAN 245–52 (1986) (describing Bob 
Dylan’s Another Side of Bob Dylan and fans’ and critics’ reactions to it). 
38. See Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Creativity and Problem-Solving, in THE 
NEGOTIATOR’S FIELDBOOK  407, 408–10 (Andrea Kupfer Schneider & Christopher 
Honeyman eds., 2006) (emphasizing the use of different words as a means to see new possible 
solutions). 
12 - WELSH-11 (DO NOT DELETE) 6/21/2012  9:46 PM 
884 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [95:873 
play “dignified role[s],” behave “decently” and “constructively,” and 
ultimately arrive at solutions that are “well thought-out” and 
“appropriate.” 
Courts are supposed to resolve disputes, of course, but they are also 
supposed to provide something special in how they resolve those disputes. 
Courts should provide an “experience of justice”39 for those involved in 
the dispute.  Such an experience involves civil treatment of, and decent 
behavior by, all of the actors; decision-making that is grounded in 
reason; and solutions that demonstrate thoughtfulness.  Recently, 
Jeremy Waldron wrote that law (unlike the raw exercise of coercive 
power) is characterized by its aspiration to treat people as dignified 
agents.40  Dignified agents do not have the power of principals.  
Nonetheless, such agents exercise responsibility, possess areas of 
discretion, and are deserving of respect as reasoning individuals. 
This commitment to an experience of justice—or more formally, 
“procedural justice”—should characterize all of the dispute resolution 
processes offered by courts.  Such an expectation is relatively 
uncontroversial, as applied to trial and court-connected non-binding 
arbitration.41  But expectations of procedural justice can and should also 
apply to court-connected mediation42 and judicial settlement 
 
39. Welsh, Stepping Back Through, supra note 7, at 671. 
40. Jeremy J. Waldron, How Law Protects Dignity 8, 21 (N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law, 
Working Paper No. 317, 2012). 
41. See NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CRTS., COURTOOLS, TRIAL COURT PERFORMANCE 
MEASURES: ACCESS AND FAIRNESS (2005), available at 
http://www.ncsconline.org/D_Research/CourTools/Images/courtools_measure1.pdf (survey 
tool focusing on litigants’ perceptions of access and procedural and substantive fairness); E. 
Allan Lind et al., In the Eye of the Beholder: Tort Litigants’ Evaluations of Their Experiences 
in the Civil Justice System, 24 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 953 (1990) (reporting procedural justice 
perceptions of litigants whose cases went to trial, non-binding arbitration, judicial settlement 
conferences, and bilateral negotiation).  But see Mark Spottswood, Live Hearings and Paper 
Trials, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 827, 829 (2011) (urging that “[d]espite the frequent affirmation 
of the value of presence in the fact-finding process by legal thinkers, we shall see that live 
hearings and trials sometimes aid, but often hinder, the fair adjudication of disputes”). 
42. See Nancy A. Welsh, Disputants’ Decision Control in Court-Connected Mediation: A 
Hollow Promise Without Procedural Justice, 2002 J. DISP. RESOL. 179, 180 (2002) [hereinafter, 
Welsh, Hollow Promise]; Welsh, Making Deals, supra note 7, at 837; Welsh, Stepping Back 
Through, supra note 7, at 619–25, 629–32, 651–57, 663–65 (reporting results of a qualitative 
empirical research project that suggested that parties value mediation for “the procedural 
justice it provides and its assistance in helping them achieve resolution—or at least some sort 
of progress toward resolution”; and also reporting, consistent with prior procedural justice 
research, that parties value mediation’s ability to provide them with the opportunity to be 
heard in a dignified and thorough process and, to a lesser extent, the opportunity to hear each 
other).  Joseph B. Stulberg, Must a Mediator Be Neutral?  You’d Better Believe It!, 95 MATQ.. 
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conferences.43  There is even some suggestion that procedural justice can 
and should apply to lawyers’ unassisted negotiation, particularly when 
such negotiation occurs during litigation, in the explicit shadow of the 
courts.44  Indeed, the procedural justice offered by courts has the 
potential to extend beyond the public sphere, encouraging greater 
procedural justice in private pre-litigation consensual processes.45 
If the court ADR field embraces procedural justice as the common 
value that binds it to other court processes, we may be more likely to 
move beyond our current ugly duckling phase.  If the court ADR field 
also embraces hybrid procedures that combine facilitative and mediative 
functions with evaluative and adjudicative functions in order to enable 
the invocation of procedural due process jurisprudence,46 we may move 
even more quickly into the next phase.  Mediation is then likely to 
 
L. REV. 829 (2012). 
43. Indeed, colleagues and I are currently engaged in developing a tool that would 
provide feedback to judges regarding their management of settlement conferences, including 
litigants’ and lawyers’ perceptions of procedural justice.  See Bobbi McAdoo & Nancy Welsh, 
Court-Connected General Civil ADR Programs: Aiming for Institutionalization, Efficient 
Resolution, and the Experience of Justice, in ADR HANDBOOK FOR JUDGES 1, 30–32 (Donna 
Stienstra & Susan M. Yates eds., 2004). 
44. See Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, The Psychology of Procedural Justice in the Federal 
Courts, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 127, 175 (2011); Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff & Tom R. Tyler, 
Procedural Justice and the Rule of Law: Fostering Legitimacy in Alternative Dispute 
Resolution, 2011 J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 2 (2011) (recommending procedural justice for ADR 
disputants to ensure the rule of law); Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff & Tom R. Tyler, 
Procedural Justice in Negotiation: Procedural Fairness, Outcome Acceptance, and Integrative 
Potential, 33 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 473, 474 (2008) (discussing how treating parties fairly can 
improve lawyers’ client representation); Nancy A. Welsh, The Reputational Advantages of 
Demonstrating Trustworthiness: Using the Reputation Index with Law Students, 28 NEGOT. J. 
117, 136 (2012) (discussing how negotiators who engage in the cooperative aspects of 
procedural justice are perceived as more trustworthy and effective); Nancy A. Welsh, 
Perceptions of Fairness, in THE NEGOTIATOR’S FIELDBOOK 165 (Andrea Kupfer Schneider 
& Christopher Honeyman eds., 2006).  
45. See Nancy A. Welsh, I Could Have Been A Contender: Summary Jury Trial as a 
Means to Overcome Iqbal’s Negative Effects Upon Pre-Litigation Communication, Negotiation 
and Early, Consensual Dispute Resolution, 114 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1149, 1154–55 (2010). 
46. Note that procedural justice is related to, but not synonymous with, the procedural 
due process jurisprudence.  Such jurisprudence has only been found to apply when those 
deemed to be state actors make the decision to deprive individuals of life, liberty, or property.  
Court-connected mediators who only facilitate the parties’ communication and negotiation do 
not possess such powers.  See Welsh, Hollow Promise, supra note 39, at 187–89.  This 
presumption may not hold, however, for mediators who make binding procedural and 
evidentiary decisions or provide the court with recommended dispositions.  The simple label 
of “mediator” will not insulate a neutral from this jurisprudence.  Its application will depend 
upon a functional analysis of the mediator’s role.  See, e.g., Wash. Cent. R.R. Co., Inc. v. Nat’l 
Mediation Bd., 830 F. Supp. 1343, 1363 (1993). 
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continue to have a place, but for a smaller set of cases, involving parties 
who affirmatively prefer a process that facilitates their ability to listen to 
each other, collaborate as appropriate, and make serious decisions 
together in a deliberative, thoughtful manner.47 
I cannot promise, much as I would like, that this next phase will 
involve becoming the equivalent of the beautiful swan.  (And even 
beautiful swans grow old and must move aside as the next crop of loud 
and ugly ducklings arrives.)  But rather than resisting our field’s 
inevitable evolution, I suggest simply that the proponents of the court 
ADR field make an explicit choice regarding our route.  By making such 
a choice and embracing our journey, we will model what we ask of the 
disputants who participate in mediation.  We may also hope to move 
intentionally toward a future that offers us meaning, and perhaps even a 
measure of beauty and grace. 
 
 
47. See Riskin & Welsh, supra note 6, at 928–29. 
